Truth and truths

In the last post I wrote about my understanding of the originality of morality, endorsing Humean distinction between fact and value. I said that I disagree with the philosophers who makes the objectivity of morality tethered to the repudiation of distinction between fact and value. These philosophers, claiming that objectivity of morality comes from the possiblity for a mere fatucal statement to entail value judgment insintrically, might not be doing jobs on the right track, for I think in the job of depicting the fact there can be already mixture of something beyond fact.

Last week I read something by John Searle. (The Construction of Social Reality, 1990: 14) With an example of heart, he argues that even in biolgoy there is no factual statement as just factual. To claim “a heart’s normal function is to pump blood” is based on such evaluative judgment derived from the following syllogism: (1) anything impinges positively on survival is the function of the subject; (2) it is a fact that the heart pumping blood effectively is benefical to survival; (3)therefore the heart functions to pump blood. If we change “survival” into another standard as “making sound”, then the function of heart is “to beat” which is obviously anther bare fact about the heart. Thus Searle rightly advocates that “Functions, in short, are never intrinsic but are always observer relative. We are blinded to this fact by the practice, especially in biology, of talking about functions as if they were intrinsic to nature.” (14)

But normally we are afraid of such conclusion, for we are afraid of being relative. In biology there might be less disputes about the dominant value of survival and reproduction of certain species, but in human affairs there might be too many disputes about how I should live, about what should I believe and not to believe, or about why I should be generous instead of not to strangers outside our community. While one can stand along the same line with Rorty who advocates the existance of truth, rather than Truth with a capital T, it is not easy to believe so in each and every aspect of life. When the need of toleration is going hand in hand with the acknowledgment of diversity, the question of justification of each different kinds of so called truth remains equally urgent, and people might become worried about the limitation of tolerance, and even the justification of tolerance.

It is a common sense that human beings not only share some basic and universal features but also have their specialities. Deciding when and how to justify either of them needs wisdom. But what is wisdom if its legitimation and truth cannot be justified? It is an empirical domain and I don't think it is where philosophors should be. Philosophers are not used to tell you how to decide between the conflicting values, but they can only testify and examine your way in which you reach your conclusion.

Back to Searle, we do “discover” functions in nature, he says, “only within a set of prior assignments of value” (including purposes, teleology, and other functions). (1990: 14) Philosophy is unable to help people to have faith in the goodness or in God. If philosophy should has its aim to set goals for life, to decide meaning for life, it is not because it is philosophy and it has that capacity, but because we value philosophy as such. I think philosophy is only a tool, but invaluable tool. As a tool, philosophy has its limits. Everything has its limits. Helping people to realize it, however, is philosophy’s invaluable job which might be peculiar only to philosophy.

And back to the problem of Truth and truths, philosophers are unable to tell you what is truth, but only show you by their efforts that truth is worth seeking. One might think that such conclusion says nothing, but only palys a game of word, which I agree partly, but once one is looking at Socrates, one has to admit of something worth entertaining in it. The person who believes in god’s calling to sacrifice himself in the pursuit of truth, never successfully achieve any conclusion.