Friday, March 19, 2010

Some Thoughts About Morality

Recently I have been caught by the question of Fact/Value Distinction. It seems to me that human beings are moral animals is just a truism, but the real problem here is the matter of justification. How do you know that? How do you know that human beings are different from animals, even thought animals which have high intelligence such as dolphins? MacIntyre claims in his book, Dependent Rational Animals, that even though dolphins are to a great extent similar to human beings in terms of their abilities to communicate with their fellow dolphins, to learn from their human trainers, and to have the feeling of happiness when they are rewarded by successfully fininishing the tasks, human beings are different from animals in an essential way that they can establish and develop such virtues as giving and receiving.

However, what makes me feel unsatisfied is that I don't see any difference between dolphins and human beings, if the sense of giving and receiving, the ability to learn and communicate with others, and the phenomenon of feeling happy or sorrow of human beings are only in a quantitative way superior to those of dolphin. Either dolphins are moral beings as human beings, or human beings are non-moral beings as intelligent dolphins. If not so, at least one reason is needed to show that where the sense of morality comes from to transit animals that are mere animals without sense of morality into the human animals knowing eating their fellow animals are vicious. It might be helpful here to remind people of the question raised by Hume that what makes the facts, that a young tree eats his mother tree for the sake of living and the other fact that a young man eats his mother, morally different, for the same reason for living? What makes cannibalism a moral issue?

My point of view is based on the Humean credo of the distinction between fact and value. Moral judgment is the result of human projection. But there are many moral philosophers objecting to such understanding, for they argue that morality has a realistic foundation, independent of human projections, on which we are able to have a solid and basic moral judgment concerning the vice of killing, lying, cannibalism etc. These philosophers strongly repudiate such interpretation of morality as emotivism which they belive is going to destroy the objectivity of the domain of morality. On the part of the objectivity of morality I agree with these philosophers, but I doubt their belief in the relationship between the moral objectivity and the denial of distinction between fact and value.

It is factually true that human beings have such and such features, emotions, and rational capacities, but it is a mystery that the same fact of cannibalism means differently between humans and trees. If one answers that because human beings are moral animals while trees are not, one can be further asked for a justification: why human beins are moral animals or how do you know that? I imagine one response for him:

He might claim that because cannibalism is intrinsically vicious and human beings know that, But I can further challenge him by asking how do you know human beings know rightly about the badness of cannibalism? Of course most sane people know that canniblism should be forbidded as vicious, but what matters here is the problem of why. Unless one ends up being a Moore who raises both of his hands as two proofs for the external world, I can keep asking the question: what if all human beings’ knowing some facts as intrinsically morally wrong turns out out to be wrong?

Repudiating my question as insanely skeptical is unfair, because I am not aiming at destroying whatever conclusion offered by anyone, but only curious about the reason and hope that he can give me a more explicit and convincing explanation which is not just an assertion as "self-obvious".

Also, trying to prevent me from investigating by appealing to God, which seems better than by ending up claiming intrinsic goodness as self-explanatory, is not as convincing as he believes to be. However, I can see no better way. Of course there are other ways such as claiming the objectivity of rationality, or the objectivity of human passions such as the sense of sympathy, but they are all liable to be challenged by the question of “HOW do you know that is not ILLUSORY?” It drives me crazy.

Personally speaking, I believe that value becomes value because it is valued as value. Even in the fact that human beings are moral animals we can find something not merely facutal. More precisely, morality becomes morality because it is moralized. But the same question can always emerge: how do you know that?

I just know it.I just believe it. No better way.

2 comments:

  1. Lily.... I love this post. It is interesting that both you and I have the same idea of what Nietzsche would call the compounding valuation of morality per generation, but seem to have different wants for the function/future direction of moral value.
    For sake of example lets take Nietzsche's genealogical understanding of "justice" as it has been made to serve as a moral virtue.
    From "Human, All Too Human:" " . . .Since in accordance with their intellectual habit, men have forgotten the original purpose of so-called just and fair actions, and especially because children have for millennia been trained to admire and imitate such actions, it has gradually come to appear that just action is an unegoistic one: but it is on this appearance that the high value accorded it depends . . . [on how much it has been] striven for, imitated multiplied through sacrifice and [thus] grows as the worth of the toil and zeal expended by each individual is added to the worth of the valued thing-"
    Sorry for the long quote, but I cannot articulate the point any better than what he has already written.
    I claim neither a god, nor an intrinsic goodness for this investigation. And I definitely do not think your skepticism goes far enough to be even remotely insane.
    I like your reference to Hume where he seems to show the animal kingdom as obeying "laws" (if you could call them that) which inherently promote the necessity of their continued existence-- and where our moral interpretation(s) and extrapolations would want to erupt with objection. Nietzsche compliments this idea where he metaphorically asserts that there is nothing "strange about the fact that lambs bear a grudge towards large birds of prey: but that is no reason to blame the large birds of prey for carrying off the little lambs." Just like your examples suggest, it results in nonsense when impose our synthetic and valuated moral notions onto the rest of the animal kingdom. So, yes, what kind of animals are we? Intelligent-moral animals, or just intelligent animals who have intellectualized morality into existence in ways which may or may not be in the business of best promoting the maximization of human existence or even, at base, the assured continuation of our existence.

    "I just know it. I just believe it." Says a lot about the state in which we all find ourselves trying to rationalize how and why we find ourselves with moral values today. Hume also goes on to say in his "Essay Concerning Human Understanding" that religion does not pass logical analysis: "Our most holy religion is founded on faith, not reason, and religion is not fitted to endure rational examination. This is the worst thing you can do to it. The Christian religion cannot convince us of its veracity without belief in miracles, most contrary to our reason and experience." It seems that some things imparted from all religions have contributed to us things we are told to "value," and, like you say, therefore only are valuable because they are circularly valued-- either by societal mandate or through cultural production.

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  2. thank you for your supportive reply. I believe in the end what save us is faith, because faith to a great extent does not need justification...jaja,sounds irrational and liable to be wicked...but that s the limitation of human being....just like love experience, we dont have to have strong justification, but you believe him or her...

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